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Abstract
The issues of procuring the cybersecurity of modern industrial systems and
networks acquire special urgency because of imperfection of their protection tools
and presence of vulnerabilities. International standards ISA/IEC 62443 offer the
system risk-oriented approach to solve the tasks of providing the security of indus-
trial control systems (ICS) at all stages of life cycle. But in view of high uncertainty
and complexity of procedure of formalizing the factors affecting the final indices of
system security, the problem of cybersecurity risk assessment remains open and
requires applying new approaches based on the technology of data mining and
cognitive modeling. Cognitive modeling of risk assessment using fuzzy grey cogni-
tive maps (FGCM) allows us to take into account the uncertainty factor arising in
the process of vulnerability probability assessment for each of security nodes. The
interval estimates of FGCM connection weights can reflect the scatter of expert
group opinions that allows us to take into account more completely the data avail-
able for risk analysis. The main stages of ICS security assessment with use of FGCM
are analyzed in the chapter on the example of distributed industrial automation
network. The recommendations concerning the choice of the necessary counter-
measures improving the level of network security in the conditions of possible
external and internal threats are considered.
Keywords: fuzzy grey cognitive map, cybersecurity risk analysis,
industrial automation systems, cognitive modeling, integrity control model
automation system
1. Introduction
Digital economy, cyber-physical objects, cyberspace, and Internet of Things are
concepts that have firmly entered our lives in recent years. As a part of industrial
revolution “Industry 4.0,” the face of modern industrial enterprises, which actively
use the transition to unmanned production technologies, the integration of
information technologies into the most complex production processes, has
dramatically changed. In this case, a distinctive feature of production is the close
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connection of technological networks with the corporate network, as it is necessary
both for production management and for administration of industrial networks
and systems. Modern technological networks, as a rule, have direct access to the
Internet, for example, for maintenance and technical support of industrial automa-
tion systems by employees of organizations—contractors. Also, computers of con-
tractors, developers, integrators, and system/network administrators connected to
the technological network of the service company from the outside often have free
access to the Internet.
Under such conditions, the problem of ensuring the security (cybersecurity) of
industrial automation and control systems (IACS) sharply increases. In corporate
networks, the object of protection is information and the problem of ensuring the
confidentiality of information is primarily addressed. However, in the case of
industrial automated control systems, the object of protection is already technolog-
ical processes (TP), and not ensuring the confidentiality of information comes to
the fore, but first of all ensuring the continuity and integrity of the TP itself.
Speaking of IACS cybersecurity, the so-called digital attacks (cyber-attacks) are
primarily considered associated with exposure to IACS through the control and
monitoring devices—controllers, data acquisition and transmission devices, SCADA
servers, workstations, telecom equipment, communication lines, etc.
The severity and relevance of IACS cybersecurity problem are confirmed by
statistics of recent years, showing a sharp increase in the number of the targeted
attacks on industrial networks and systems, as well as an increase in the scale of
consequences of these attacks. A vivid example of a large-scale cyber-attack that hit
a lot of companies around the world from May 12 to May 15, 2017 is the attack of a
network worm—the coder WannaCry [1]. Among the victims of this well-
coordinated attack were companies engaged in various types of production, oil
refineries, urban infrastructure facilities, and distribution power grids.
In May 2018, VPNFilter malware, which infected at least 500,000 routers and
data storage devices in 54 countries around the world, was detected. The purpose of
this software is to steal credentials, detect industrial SCADA equipment, and carry
out various attacks using infected devices in the botnets. June 2018 was marked by a
large-scale cyber-attack on telecommunications companies, communication satel-
lite operators, and defense contractors in the United States and Southeast Asia.
During the attack, the attackers infected computers used for managing the com-
munication satellites and collecting geoposition data. According to experts’ opin-
ions, the purpose of the cyber-attack was espionage and data interception from
civilian and military communication channels. In total, according to Kaspersky Lab,
the share of attacked IACS computers in the world in 2018 increased by 3.2%
compared with 2017 and amounted to 47.2% [2].
Considering the seriousness of the current situation and the need to take urgent
measures, the international community and information security experts are
concerned about finding effective ways to solve the problem of ensuring the secu-
rity of industrial automated systems. For instance, the European Commission has
developed the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Several
international standards for ensuring the cybersecurity of automated process control
systems have been proposed and effectively used in world practice, such as NERC
Critical Infrastructure Protection, NIST SP 800-82 Guide to Industrial Control
Systems Security, ISA/IEC 62443 Industrial Automation and Control Systems
Security [3, 4].
The basis of the requirements presented by the ISA/IEC 62443 standards series
for ensuring the IACS security is a risk-oriented approach. In accordance with this
approach, designing of a management system for a protected IACS involves the
following stages:
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• high-level (preliminary) risk assessment of cyber-attacks effects;
• building a reference model of IACS as the protection object, describing the
classification of main activities types, technological process, automatic control
systems, and other assets;
• building an asset model, describing the hierarchy of main objects and assets of
IACS, their interaction with networks, key divisions, etc.;
• building a reference architecture model, reflecting all basic elements of IACS,
telecommunication equipment, communication lines, etc.;
• building a zone and conduct model, dividing the protected object into separate
security zones;
• detailed risk analysis for each selected zone; and
• determination of the current security level for each zone and requirements to
ensure the target security level of the zone, implemented by the choice of
appropriate protection measures.
At the same time, the “bottleneck” of the above normative documents regulating
the issues of ensuring IACS cybersecurity is the absence of formalized methods for
detailed risk assessment. As the volume of statistical data, development of mathe-
matical models of risk, threats, and security incidents increase, it becomes topical to
develop methods and algorithms for quantitative risk assessment, ensuring the
possibility of a reasonable choice of IACS devices and the necessary countermea-
sures both within individual security zones and ensuring the required cybersecurity
level of IACS as a whole.
A promising way to solve this problem is the use of technology of cognitive
modeling, based on construction and analysis of fuzzy grey cognitive maps
(FGCM), which has been widely used in recent years [5–10]. Fuzzy grey (interval)
cognitive maps are considered to be a good extension of fuzzy cognitive maps
(FCM) family, since they are better suited to experts representations, have a greater
interpretability and provide more degrees of freedom to the decision making person
on the basis of modeling results.
Brief information concerning the “grey” system, the “grey” number, and the
“grey” variable is presented below, and the mathematical apparatus of FGCM is
considered. Then, on the example of solving the problem of ensuring the integrity
of telemetric information in IACS, the technique of assessing the cybersecurity risks
with use of FGCM is discussed. In the end of the chapter, the conclusions are drawn
and the list of references is given.
Let us note one important circumstance. When considering below a specific
example of AIS risk assessment using FGCM (Section 2), an approach based on
decomposition of the original (integrated) FGCM by disclosing (detailing) the
content of its concepts is used, resulting in the set of interconnected local FGCM
that characterize certain aspects of AIS risks assessment procedure associated with
the features of its subsystems. In ideological plan, this approach is based on the
FCM decomposition theory and the algebra of FCM causal transformations pro-
posed in [11, 12]. However, the main difference between the approach described in
[12] and our approach is that in [12] the detailed FCM system of a large size comes
out as the original FCM, which reduces to a simpler (quotient) FCM by using the
operations proposed by the authors. Each concept of this quotient FCM accumulates
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information on the state of several similar concepts of the original FCM, thus
aggregating the corresponding concepts. In our case, on the contrary, the original
FGCM has a small dimension, the number of forming its basic concepts
corresponds to the number of basic subsystems of the system under study, and the
decomposition of FGCM implies a representation of each concept of the original
FGCM in the form of independent (local) FGCM, describing the behavior of
this concept.
2. Theoretical foundations of building FGCM
The basis of building FGCM is the Grey Systems Theory, proposed in 1989 by
Deng [10]. Within the framework of this theory, objects and systems with high
uncertainty, represented by small samples of incomplete and inaccurate data, are
studied. Depending on the character of the available information, the studied
systems are divided into three types:
• “white” systems (the internal structure and the properties of the system are
completely known);
• “grey” systems (partial information about the system is known); and
• “black” systems (the internal structure and the properties of the system are
completely unknown).
In accordance with the terminology of the grey systems theory, a fuzzy grey
cognitive map is a cognitive model of a system in the form of a directed graph
defined with use of the following set:
FGCM ¼ 〈C, F,W〉, (1)
where C ¼ Cif g is the set of concepts (vertices of the graph), i ¼ 1, 2,…, nð Þ; F ¼
Fij
 
is the set of connections between concepts (arcs of the graph); andW ¼
W ij
 
is the set of the relationships between the concepts determining the weights
of these connections, i, jð Þ∈Ω. Here, Ω ¼ i1, j1
 
, i2, j2
 
,…, iL, jL
  
is the set of
the pairs of adjacent (interconnected) vertices indices, L≤ n n 1ð Þ.
In contrast to the traditional FCM representation, the weights of FGCM connec-
tions are set with the use of “grey” (interval) numbers ⊗W ij, defined as
⊗W ij ∈ W ij,W ij
h i
, whereW ij <W ij, W ij,W ij
h i
∈ 1, 1½ , (2)
whereW ij andW ij are, respectively, the lower and the upper boundaries of the
grey number. So, the weight of connection between i-th and j-th concepts (Ci ! Cj)
can take any value within the given range of change W ij,W ij
h i
∈ 1, 1½ . In the
particular case, whenW ij ¼ W ij, we get ⊗W ij ∈ W ij,W ij
h i
—a “white” (crisp,
usual) number.
It is assumed that the change of the concepts state in time is described by
equations
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⊗Xi kþ 1ð Þ ¼ f ⊗Xi kð Þ þ
Xn
j ¼ 1
j 6¼ ið Þ
⊗W ji⊗Xj kð Þ
0
BBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCA
, i ¼ 1, 2,…, nð Þ, (3)
where ⊗Xi kð Þ is the “grey” (interval) variable of the i-th concept Ci state, the
values of which at each time instant k ¼ 0, 1, 2,… belong to some interval
Xi kð Þ,Xi kð Þ
 
; f is the activation function of the i-th concept, mapping the argu-
ment values into the interval 1, 1½ . The activation function f ∙ð Þ, as a rule, is
accepted in the following form:
a. linear function with saturation:
f xð Þ ¼
x, if xj j≤ 1;
sgn x, if xj j>1,
(
(4)
b. bipolar sigmoid (hyperbolic tangent):
f xð Þ ¼
1 exð Þ
1þ exð Þ
¼ th
x
2
 	
; (5)
c. unipolar sigmoid:
f xð Þ ¼ 1= 1þ exð Þ: (6)
To solve the system of equations (Eq. (3)), it is required to set the initial
conditions ⊗Xi 0ð Þ, which also should be considered as the grey numbers
⊗Xi 0ð Þ∈ Xi 0ð Þ,Xi 0ð Þ
 
. Most interesting is usually to obtain the equilibrium
(steady state) solution, which is a grey vector lim
k!∞
⊗Xi kð Þ½  ¼ ⊗X
∗
∈ X ∗ ,X ∗
 
or a
limit cycle (strange attractor).
To determine the stability of the steady-state solution ⊗X ∗ , one can use the
theorem [12], according to which the only equilibrium (steady state) solution of
equation (3) (“the fixed point”) exists if and only if
Xn
i, j¼1
W
2
ij
 !1
2
<H, (7)
where the value of the positive constant H depends on the choice of activation
function of the concepts: H ¼ 1 for function (Eq. (4)); H ¼ 2 for function (Eq. (5));
and H ¼ 4 for function (Eq. (6)). In the case of negative connection, i.e., for
W ij <W ij <0, we also put in (Eq. (7)) the upper boundaryW ij of the grey
number ⊗W ij.
More detailed information on FGCM construction and their learning algorithms
can be found in [5, 6, 9].
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3. Risk assessment of IACS cybersecurity
Let us consider the task of assessment of IACS risk on the example of the
automated system for collecting, storing, and processing the telemetric information
(TMI) of the aviation equipment manufacturer. The current information on the
state parameters of on-board aviation systems is continuously collected during the
entire period of their operation by the ground services of technical maintenance.
The detailed analysis of this information allows the subsequent making the right
management decisions on the further operation and modification of on-board avia-
tion systems. Therefore, the task of ensuring the integrity of the mentioned tele-
metric information under the conditions of possible impact of external and internal
threats undoubtedly takes on particular significance.
The generalized structure of the studied territorially distributed automated
information system (AIS), providing the collection, storage, and processing of TMI,
is presented in Figure 1.
As the parts of AIS, the following subsystems (zones), combined according to
the principle of the unity of functions performed and security requirements for
their implementation, are identified:
1.The subsystem for collecting and storing the primary data at the service
stations (Zone 1), which includes:
Element 1—the client part of the SCADA system Web-base;
Element 2—the server part of the SCADA system Web-base;
Element 3—OPC UA client;
Element 4—the temporary storage for accommodating the operative telemetry
data accumulated at the object;
Element 5—the server part of the accumulated data transmission to the storage
of the aviation equipment manufacturer;
2.The core of the corporate information network (CIN) of the enterprise-
manufacturer (Zone 2), where:
Element 6—the client part for providing access to the server of the service
station transferring the accumulated operational data of TMI to the enterprise-
manufacturer’s storage;
Element 8—the workstations of administrator and service personnel of the
CIN core of the enterprise-manufacturer;
3.TMI storage subsystem with fault tolerance functions (Zone 3), where:
Element 7—the node of access to TMI data storage at the enterprise-
manufacturer;
4.TMI data processing subsystem with the use of a hierarchy of mathematical
models of aviation equipment (Zone 4);
5.Subsystem of support and implementation of business processes of the
enterprise-manufacturer (Zone 5).
The corresponding subsystems (security zones) are interconnected (see
Figure 1) with the aid of telecommunication channels (conducts).
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Using FGCM as a tool for cognitive modeling, let us turn to the task of analyzing
the risks associated with ensuring the TMI integrity in AIS considered above, taking
into account the impact of possible external and internal threats to the system. The
original (integrated) FGCM for assessing the risks of AIS, serving in this case as the
AIS cognitive model of initial approximation (zero decomposition level), is
presented in Figure 2.
The following descriptions are used in Figure 2: superscript (“*”) denotes the
affiliation of the concept C ∗p to integrated FGCM and subscript (p) denotes the
number of the concept (Table 1).
The presence of the grey connection weights ⊗ ~W ij indicates an uncertainty in
the assessment of the mutual influence of main risk factors. The state variables of
concepts ⊗X ∗T1 , ⊗X
∗
T2
, ⊗Xi, i ¼ 1, 2,…, 5ð Þ, ⊗X
∗
R represent the probabilities of
occurrence of the enumerated events corresponding to the concepts C ∗T1 , C
∗
T2
, C ∗1 ,
…, C ∗5 ,C
∗
R . Let us note that in this case we mean so-called subjective probabilities,
reflecting the expert’s point of view on the possibility of an event occurrence [13].
Taking into account that each of these events is a complex event consisting of a
chain of consecutive elementary events, it is reasonable to decompose FGCM of AIS
Figure 1.
The generalized structure of territorially distributed automated information system for the collection, storage,
and processing of TMI. The corresponding subsystems (security zones) are interconnected with the aid of
telecommunication channels (conducts).
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shown in Figure 2 as the set of FGCMs for separate concepts (AIS security zones
containing targets objects for attack to TMI).
The first decomposition level of the original (integrated) FGCM is presented in
Figure 3.
The following designations of the concepts are used in Figure 3: the superscript
(q) of Cqp indicates the belongings to the concept Cq of the integrated FGCM; and
the subscript (p) is the number of the concepts in the FGCM of the first level of
decomposition (Table 2).
Figure 4 shows the further decomposition level (the second level) for the con-
cept C ∗1 , allowing to make clearer the impact of the threats on the considered target
concept.
On the scheme, the following designations of the concepts of FGCM second-
level decomposition are used: the superscript (q) of the Cq,pr concept is the number
of the concept (the parent concept of the zero decomposition level) of the original
FGCM whose decomposition includes this element, the superscript index p is the
number of the parent concept of the first level of decomposition, the subscript (r) is
the number of the concept of the current level (Table 3).
The further decomposition of the third level allows us to go to the detailed
FGCM, which allows us to take into account the influence of individual vulnerabil-
ities on the potential violation of TMI integrity in the intermediate information
processing elements.
Figure 2.
Integrated FGCM for AIS risk assessment. ⊗ ~W ij—the grey connection weights indicate an uncertainty in the
assessment of the mutual influence of main risk factors and C ∗—concepts.
Concept Concept name
C ∗T1 Internal threat to TMI integrity (e.g., due to failures or erroneous actions of staff)
C ∗T2 External threat to TMI integrity (e.g., due to attempts of unauthorized access from outside
to information)
C ∗1 Modification of TMI data in Zone 1
C ∗2 Modification of TMI data in Zone 2
C ∗3 Modification of TMI data in Zone 3
C ∗5 Modification of TMI data in Zone 5
C ∗R Potential damage caused by violation of TMI integrity in AIS
Table 1.
List of the concepts of the integrated FGCM.
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As for the concept C1, 11 , characterizing the possibility to run in the browser of
the client part of SCADA system on the base on Web technology (Zone 1), the
corresponding decomposition can be represented as FGCM in Figure 5.
Here, the numbers 1–5 denote the following concepts:
1. the exploitation of the vulnerability of OS authorization system;
2.the exploitation of the vulnerability of SCADAWeb client;
3. the exploitation of the vulnerability of OS browser for launching the client part
of SCADA;
4.the exploitation of the vulnerability of access to OS memory;
5.the exploitation of the vulnerability of OPC UA client authorization system.
Similarly, it is possible to decompose the other concepts of original FGCM for
the second decomposition level of Zone 1 presented in Figure 4 (Figures 6–9,
Tables 4–6). The corresponding FGCM, revealing the content of the concept C1, 12
(Zone 2), is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 3.
The first level of FGCM decomposition to assess the AIS risks.
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Consider the numerical example of risk assessment for the conceptC1, 11 (Figure 5).
Let us assume that while choosing the grey values of FGCM weights, it is
necessary to focus on a certain fuzzy scale, which determines the strength of the
connections between different concepts (see, e.g., Table 7).
Let us further assume that the expert estimated the values of FGCM connections
weights in Figure 5 as follows (Table 8).
Concept Concept name Parent
concept
T11  T
8
1
Internal threats to the integrity of TMI (concept T ∗1 decomposition on the
block diagram of AIS, Figure 1, i.e., the points of potential realization of the
threat to TMI integrity by the internal subject of the system)
T ∗1
T12,T
2
2
External threats to TMI integrity (concept T ∗2 decomposition) T
∗
2
C11 Access to TMI in the client-server SCADAWeb-base before adding to the
database of TMI operational storage
C ∗1 (Zone 1)
C12 Access to the database of operative TMI data storage
C13 Access to the network equipment
C14 Access to the module of Web server sending TMI data in the long-term
storage of the enterprise-manufacturer
C25 Access to the network infrastructure C
∗
2 (Zone 2)
C26 Access to the Web client module that implements receiving TMI at the
enterprise-manufacturer from remote service stations
C28 Unauthorized access to workstation (node 8 in Figure 1) of the core of CIN of
the enterprise-manufacturer
C210 Access to the server of equipment status reports generated for users of Zone 4
C37 Access to TMI in the long-term storage C
∗
3 (Zone 3)
C59 Access to computing cluster management server of Zone 5 C
∗
5 (Zone 5)
IST5 TMI integrity control model
Table 2.
List of the first level decomposition concepts of the FGCM.
Figure 4.
The second level of FGCM decomposition for assessing AIS risk in Zone 1.
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Let us take a bipolar sigmoid (5) here as an activation function f ∙ð Þ for the
concepts 1–5. Checking condition (7) for the data presented in Table 2 shows that
X5
i, j¼1
W
2
ij
 !1
2
¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2, 76
p
¼ 1:66< 2, (8)
i.e., the steady-states of FGCM will be stable.
Concept Concept name Parent concept
C1, 11 Access to HMI client SCADA C
1
1
C1, 12 Access to operative TMI data on the client-server part of the SCADA
before entering in the operative storage
C1, 23 Access to the client to interact with the OPC UA server C
1
2
C1, 24 Access to the database of operative TMI storage data
Table 3.
List of second-level decomposition concepts for Zone 1.
Figure 5.
The third level of FGCM decomposition—the concept C1, 1:1
Figure 6.
Decomposition of the concept C1, 12 of FGCM for AIS risk assessment (Zone 1)
Figure 7.
Decomposition of the concepts C1, 36 and C
1, 4
5 of the second level of FGCM decomposition
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Using for calculation the “Cognitive Map Constructor” tool, which is described
more detailed in the next section of this chapter, we will estimate the change in the
upper and lower boundaries of the state variable X5 over time k ¼ 1, 2, 3,…
Figure 8.
Decomposition of the concepts C1, 23 and C
1, 2
4 of FGCM for AIS risk assessment
Figure 9.
FGCM concepts states for risk assessment of Zone 1 (the change in the state of concepts over time and the final
states of the target concepts of the FGCM, software window form).
Concept Concept name Parent
concept
6 Exploitation of the vulnerability of authorization system of the primary OS
user
C1, 12
7 Exploitation of the vulnerability of access to operating system memory
8 Exploitation of the vulnerability of Java virtual machine
9 Exploitation of the vulnerability of system software of application server for
running the SCADA server Web application
10 The target concept of access to operative TMI data, which can be modified
before adding to the database on the nodes of SCADA client-server type
Table 4.
List of the concepts of the third decomposition level for AIS risks assessment of Zone 1.
12
Digital Forensic Science
(Tables 9 and 10). The state of the input concept CT1 is defined here as ⊗XT1 kð Þ ¼
0:8;1½  for all ¼ 0, 1, 2,…; the initial conditions for other state variables
⊗X1 0ð Þ÷⊗X5 0ð Þ are assumed to be zero, i.e., equal to 0;0½ .
Concept Concept name Parent
concept
19 Exploitation of the vulnerability of authorization system of the main OS user C1, 45
20 Exploitation of the vulnerability of system software implementing work of
Apache Web application server, MySQL DBMS, PHP runtime frameworks to
support interactive Web pages
21 Exploitation of the vulnerability of OS memory access
22 Exploitation of the vulnerability of Java Virtual Machine Memory Access
23 Exploitation of the vulnerability of Application Server Software
24 The target concept of unauthorized launching of the module for access to the
database of operative storage of TMI at service stations
25 Exploitation of the vulnerability of authorization system of the main OS user C1, 36
26 Exploitation of the vulnerability of access to operating system memory
Table 5.
List of the concepts of the third decomposition level of Zone 1.
Concept Concept name Parent
concept
14 Exploitation of the vulnerability of authorization system of the main OS user C1, 24
15 Exploitation of the vulnerability of OS memory access
16 Exploitation of the vulnerability of authorization system of the main DBMS
user
17 Exploitation of the vulnerability of DBMS memory access
18 The target concept of unauthorized modification of TMI operative data TMI
stored in the database
11 Exploitation of the vulnerability of authorization system of the client part of
OPC Client UA software
C1, 23
12 Exploitation of the vulnerability of authorization system of the main OS user
13 Exploitation of the vulnerability of OS memory access
Table 6.
List of the concepts of the third level of FGCM decomposition of Zone 1.
Linguistic meaning of connection strength Numeric range
Does not affect 0
Very weak (0; 0.15]
Weak (0.15; 0.35]
Average (0.35; 0.6]
Strong (0.6; 0.85]
Very strong (0.85; 1]
Table 7.
Evaluation of the strength of communication between concepts.
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As a result, the steady-state value of the grey state vector ⊗X for FGCM
presented in Figure 6, i.e., for the concept C1, 11 decomposition is found as
⊗X ¼ 0, 8;1½ , 0, 43;0, 58½ , 0, 28;0, 55½ , 0, 20;0, 40½ , 0, 06;0, 16½ , 0, 24;0, 53½ f g,
and the final value for the target concept state is determined by the grey number
⊗X5 ∈ 0, 24;0, 53½ .
Consider the state of the target concept CR (Figure 2)—the damage caused by
the potential violation of TMI integrity in the AIS—after clarifying all weights by
the level of decomposition of the original FGCM. Let us assume that the active
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Xi
X1 0.36 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
X2 0 0.125 0.28 0.40 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.55
X3 0 0.125 0.24 0.32 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.40
X4 0 0.054 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
X5 0 0 0.093 0.23 0.36 0.45 0.50 0.53
Table 9.
Upper boundaries of concept state estimates
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Xi
X1 0.24 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
X2 0 0.059 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.28
X3 0 0.059 0.115 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20
X4 0 0.018 0.034 0.046 0.052 0.058 0.06 0.06
X5 0 0 0.034 0.087 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.24
Table 10.
Lower boundaries of concept state estimates.
Connection weight The value of the connection weight Greyness (scatter of assessment)
WT11 [0.6; 0.75] 0.075
W12 [0.5; 0.7] 0.1
W13 [0.5; 0.7] 0.1
W14 [0.15; 0.3] 0.075
W25 [0.55; 0.65] 0.05
W32 [0.35; 0.55] 0.1
W35 [0.55; 0.65] 0.05
W42 [0.3; 0.5] 0.1
W43 [0.15; 0.3] 0.075
W45 [0.2; 0.45] 0.125
Table 8.
The values of communications FGCM weights.
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threat is the internal threat of violation of the integrity of TMI, the value of which is
determined by a grey number ⊗X ∗T1 ∈ 0, 6;0, 95½ .
Risk assessment because of violation of the integrity of TMI information is
defined as ⊗X ∗R

A
∈ 0:19;0:28½ .
To reduce the potential damage from the violation of TMI integrity, a monitor-
ing system, deployed as a protected container in Zone 5, is used. In Figure 3, this
information protection tool is designated as a TMI integrity monitoring model—
concept IST5. The protected container ensures the continuous operation of the TMI
integrity monitoring system, which implements online and offline analysis of
operational data and data collected in the repository (Zone 3).
The concept of TMI integrity monitoring system as a whole has some
peculiarities:
• Simulated parameters of the aviation engine operation and TMI can be
presented in the form of multidimensional technological time series;
• Monitoring the TMI integrity is based on the analysis of the consistency of the
behavior of parameters obtained by using the model of complex technical
object, and taken from the on-board aircraft systems;
• The output of the monitoring system is the evaluation of conditional
probability of the events of data integrity violation events.
Risk value estimate due to violation of TMI information integrity after applying
the tool based on the integrity monitoring model is ⊗X ∗R

A
∈ 0:07;0:15½ .
Due to the significant amount of computation when working with FGCM
containing a large number of concepts, it was necessary to develop a software tool
to automate cognitive modeling with use of FGCM. The change in the state of
concepts over time and the final states of the target concepts of the FGCM, calcu-
lated in the developed software tool, are presented in Figure 9.
4. Automation of risk analysis and management on the base of cognitive
modeling technology
To improve an efficiency of risk analysis and management with use of
FGCM, the special software tool “Cognitive Map Constructor” was developed. This
software allows us to build and edit FGCM, use them to carry out the security
risk analysis, and justify the choice of the necessary countermeasures from
the given user-specified set. As a result, a diagram of risk assessment is built
under various scenarios of countermeasures’ implementation and threats’
realization.
Besides supporting the FGCM with the installation of connections weights in the
form of the upper and lower boundaries, the software allows us the use of linguistic
terms of fuzzy logic, as well as setting the weights in the form of “white” crisp
numbers. The software has the interface implemented in HTML using CSS, which
allows displaying the FGCM and all the necessary accompanying information by the
concepts and connections, and also is able to work on any graphical operating
system that has a current Web browser.
There are five kinds of concepts which are used in FGCM: threats, information
assets, intermediate concepts, targets, and countermeasures, which can be marked
by different colors for convenience and clarity.
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The set of the options depends on the type of the concept, but in most cases its
name is specified with description, as well as its current state. In the case when the
weights of all connections, pointing to the concept, are assumed to be equal, one can
mark the option “Imposed weight” and set the desired value. For countermeasures,
it is permissible to indicate which of existing countermeasure it is, that allows
realizing situations when one countermeasure acts on several connections at once.
To establish the relationships between the concepts, it is necessary to click on the
button “Placement” of the action group “Connections” in the tool window. After
that, the connections are located by pressing consecutively on the initial and final
element. The located countermeasures and initial states of the concepts can be
adjusted and combined, creating the different scenarios that allow us to compare
the effectiveness of countermeasures.
Figures 10 and 11 show the FGCM risk estimates built in the “Cognitive Map
Constructor.”
Thus, the developed software “Cognitive Map Constructor” allows evaluating
the effectiveness of the use of the TMI integrity monitoring system in the protection
of telemetric information from the effects of external and internal threats.
Figure 10.
FGCM for risk assessment of data collection and storage subsystem at the service stations (Zone 1) (software
window form).
Figure 11.
FGCM for risk assessment in the core of the CIN (Zone 2) and TMI (software window form).
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5. Conclusions
A promising way to solve the problem of assessing the cybersecurity risks of
industrial automated systems is to model the threats realization scenarios using the
tools of topological analysis of the system security and cognitive modeling with
the aid of Fuzzy Grey Cognitive Maps.
At the basis of this approach, the construction of original FGCM is proposed to
assess the risk of automated control system with the following decomposition of
FGCM into the number of cognitive maps of the next level of detail (the same as it is
done in IDEF0 Functional Modeling technology). The features of construction of
this procedure are discussed in this chapter in relation to the task of ensuring the
telemetry information integrity in the industrial automated system for collecting,
storing, and processing information on the conditions of on-board aviation systems.
It is shown that the use of FGCM allows us to obtain more reliable estimates of
security risk factors with account of the possible variations of the available actual
data and expert opinions.
To automate the proposed risk assessment procedure in the considered system
for collecting, storing, and processing telemetry information with use of FGCM, the
software tool “Cognitive Map Constructor” was developed, which can be used for
identifying the most dangerous vulnerabilities in the system and evaluating the
effectiveness of various measures (countermeasures) realization for telemetric
information protection from the impact of external and internal threats.
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